The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care: The Case of Commerce in Transplantable Organs by Blumstein, James F.
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 3 | Issue 1
1993
The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care:
The Case of Commerce in Transplantable Organs
James F. Blumstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
James F. Blumstein, The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care: The Case of Commerce in Transplantable Organs, 3 Health Matrix 1
(1993)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol3/iss1/3
HEALTH MATRIX:
The Journal of Law-Medicine
THE USE OF FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES IN MEDICAL
CARE: THE CASE OF
COMMERCE IN
TRANSPLANTABLE ORGANSt
James F. Blumstein
INTRODUCTION
A RELATIVE NEWCOMER to organ transplant issues, I
en my experience in the field to an anthropologist's exposure
to a new culture, a new way of thinking. There are, I have learned,
holy totems and sacred cows that permeate the thinking and have
profoundly influenced the development of public policy in the organ
transplant arena. Perhaps pushing the anthropological simile to the
breaking point, I find my role to be that of the constructive archae-
ologist, investigating the existing landscape of values by uncovering
layers of buried values that have been deemed fundamental but
whose wisdom has been assumed and uncontested. These tradi-
tional values have achieved a sacrosanct status and have under-
girded policy formulation in this field. It is important to subject
these entrenched ways of thinking to careful scrutiny, to question
whether some of these values are as self-evident as has been as-
sumed, and to determine whether they are in need of reexamination
and reevaluation given the evolution of organ transplantation into
the status of mainstream, therapeutic medical care. This is particu-
t An earlier version of this article appeared in 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS
2190 (1992).
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A. 1966 Yale College,
M.A. 1970 Yale University, L.L.B. 1970 Yale Law School.
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larly the case as society is forced to confront the specific set of
problems associated with producing a better balance between the
expanding demand for transplantable organs and the currently ex-
isting inadequate level of supply.
There is widespread agreement that a shortfall exists in the
number of organs made available for purposes of organ transplanta-
tion and that the supply-side constraint is a major inhibition in the
further utilization of therapeutically promising organ transplanta-
tion techniques. "For those with failing hearts or livers, transplan-
tation . .. is the only therapy that can replace imminent certain
death with the hope of new life. But as its benefits have become
increasingly apparent and the medical barriers have fallen, the de-
mand for transplantation has grown rapidly, far outstripping the
supply of organs." 1 For example, the United Network for Organ
Sharing reports that, as of May 31, 1992, 27,120 people were on
waiting lists for organ transplants in the United States.2 These
waiting lists have gotten longer over time, with estimates suggesting
that about 200 people are added to the lists each month for kidneys
alone.3 From 1986-89, while kidney dialysis patients increased by
25,000,' kidney transplants did not increase in number and even
declined slightly from 8976 to 8899.1 Yet, evidence suggests that
transplantation is a more successful and cost effective procedure for
many dialysis patients with end-stage renal disease.6 It has been
estimated that thirty percent of patients on dialysis are candidates
for transplantation.7
Despite this fundamental supply-side problem, those in leader-
ship roles in the organ transplant movement have been strikingly
hostile to markets and to the use of financial incentives as a tool for
increasing the availability of transplantable organs. There is a
1. Spital, The Shortage of Organs for Transplantation: Where Do We Go From Here?,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1243, 1243 (1991).
2. United Network for Organ Sharing, Patients Waiting for Transplants: Number of
Patient Registrations on the National Waitlist, 8(6) UNOS UPDATE 35 (1992) (containing the
following breakdown, by organ, of the 27,120 people on the waiting list as of May 31, 1992:
kidneys (20,741); hearts (2560); livers (2113); lungs (811); pancreases (726); and heart-lungs
(169)).
3. Teri Randall, Too Few Human Organs for Transplantation, Too Many in Need...
and the Gap Widens, 265 JAMA 1223, 1223 (1991).
4. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., END-STAGE
RENAL DISEASE PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS (1989).
5. Id.
6. See Paul W. Eggers, Effect of Transplantation on the Medicare End-Stage Renal
Disease Program, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 223, 223-24 (1988).
7. F. T. Rapaport & D. Anaise, Organ Donation - 1990, 23 TRANSPLANTATION PROC.
899, 899 (1991).
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strong, visceral, adverse reaction to the introduction of commerce
in the field of transplantable organs. This weltanschauung reflects a
worldview more characteristic of an earlier era in medical care
when the role of markets in health care was hotly contested. Shib-
boleth and shamanism have thrived at the expense of rigorous anal-
ysis. It is now time to frame the issues clearly and to distill and
understand the nature of the deep-seated beliefs in the field.
I. ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION POLICY WITHIN THE
BROADER HEALTH POLICY CONTEXT
The role of financial incentives in organ transplantation should
be considered within the broader context of health policy. Ideol-
ogy, as much as technology, has driven organ transplantation pol-
icy. An intellectual orthodoxy has permeated the field. The 1986
Report of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services Task Force on Organ Transplantation (OTTF Report)' has
set the tone. It has had remarkable influence on the development of
thinking and the evolution of policy. Although many officials of
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) vigorously
disagreed with the analysis and recommendations of the Task
Force, and no evidence exists that the Department has ever adopted
the recommendations of the Task Force as official departmental
policy, it is clear that the OTTF Report has been extremely influen-
tial in the evolution of policy thinking of important constituencies
within DHHS. The OTTF Report has clearly driven the policy of
the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the organization
that holds the federal contract to administer the Organ Procure-
ment and Transplant Network (OPTN) mandated by federal law.9
And the OTTF Report has been an extremely important document
in framing thinking about organ transplantation issues in the organ
transplant community generally. From my initial exposure to or-
gan transplantation issues, I concluded that another viewpoint and
frame of reference needed expression.
A. Organ Transplantation Policy Values
If ideology, as much as technology, has driven organ transplan-
tation policy, it is appropriate to inquire what values have under-
8. See U. S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (1986) [hereinafter OTFF Report].
9. See James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ Transplantation Policy: A Time for Reassess-
ment?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 451, 476-78 (1989).
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girded organ transplantation policy in the United States. I have
identified at least five.
1. The Ethical Foundation of Altruism
Even a superficial exposure to this field reveals an intense com-
mitment to altruism. This is deemed a moral imperative. For ex-
ample, the OTTF Report stated that a core value shaping organ
transplantation policy was the goal of "[p]romoting a sense of com-
munity through acts of generosity." 10 Despite the widespread rec-
ognition of the shortage of transplantable organs, there persists an
insistence on the exclusion or elimination of commercial incentives
from all facets of the organ transplant system of organ supply, ac-
quisition or distribution. Yet, by reasonable hypothesis, one might
expect a system of financial incentives to augment the supply of
available organs for transplantation.11
2. The Role of the Potential Donor's Family
The focus of the organ transplant community is on the family of
the dying patient, who is the potential donor. There is a great con-
cern expressed for the psychological well-being of family members
of the potential organ donor as well as an emphasis on community-
spirited commitment by the family through organ donation. There
is a sense that families of a dying patient can be self-fulfilled by
reaffirming their commitment to community solidarity through the
donation of a loved one's organ for transplantation. This type of
psychological fulfillment is "a demonstration of the principle that
from a loved one's death may come some silver lining."12
A concomitant of this focus on the family is that there is an
emphasis on the bedside of the dying patient (and potential organ
donor) as the locus of decisionmaking for organ donation. It is
questionable whether the bedside is an optimal place for serious
10. OTTF Report, supra note 8, at 28.
11. There is clearly an empirical question whether commercial incentives will result in
an increase in the supply of transplantable organs. Since such transactions have been illegal
in the United States since 1984, there is no reliable data on the question from the United
States. Some critics claim that the introduction of commercial incentives could result in
reduced altruistic donating. Although experiences from abroad suggest that commercial in-
centives do work, the empirical issue is a serious and legitimate one. Where empirical, not
ethical, disagreements split policy analysts, the appropriate resolution of the debate is to run
an experiment to secure evidence on the matter. For a proposal to perform a pilot study of
the effect on organ supply of a $1000 death benefit for organ donation, see Thomas G. Peters,
Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ Donation, 265 JAMA 1302 (1991).
12. Blumstein, supra note 9, at 468.
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consideration of the complex set of issues that surround organ do-
nation decisions. The family is facing the possible death of a loved
one and is concentrating on efforts to save his or her life. It is quite
natural for family members to feel ill at ease thinking about organ
donation at a time when the grieving process has not yet com-
menced and the preferred focus of attention is on lifesaving not or-
gan donation.
Further, it can be rather awkward for professional personnel to
develop a sensitive conversation with the family of a potential donor
because the family can perceive the very topic of organ donation as
reflective of a certain prognostic pessimism. The so-called required
request procedure, adopted in legislation at the federal level and
imposed on all hospitals that participate in Medicare or Medicaid,
mandates that hospitals institutionalize a policy of routinely asking
families of potential donors whether or not they wish to donate the
organs of their dying kin for purposes of transplantation.3 Several
assumptions underlie the policy of "required request" or "routine
inquiry." Pragmatically, it was premised on the view that families
would agree to donate organs of their next of kin if only asked by
trained organ procurement personnel. Public opinion surveys
showed strong support for organ donation, so the objective was to
make sure that the families of potential donors were actually asked
about organ donation. At the same time, institutionalization was
needed "because individual professionals typically feel squeamish
about raising these sensitive issues with family members in such del-
icate circumstances. An institutional rule is needed to make the
organ donation inquiry an obligation." 4 Ideologically, "required
request" of families of potential donors is a communitarian act that
promotes altruism. It allows families of potential donors to "exer-
cise . . . the virtue of generosity," 5 performing an act that
"strengthen[s] altruism and our sense of community."16
Disappointment with the pragmatic effects of routine inquiry
policies has led some to seek out alternatives. Those alternatives,
however, will be evaluated in terms of their ideological impact and
propriety, with traditionalists likely to press for maintaining the
role of the family at the potential donor's bedside as a means of
13. See Maxwell J. Mehhman, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: A Reevaluation, 1
HEALTH MATRIx 31, 37-39 (1991).
14. Blumstein, supra note 9, at 467.
15. PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 210 (1970).
16. OTTF Report, supra note 8, at 28 (quoting a report from the Hastings Center).
HEALTH MATRIX
promoting altruism and communitarianism.Y'
Focusing on the bedside seems at odds with the legal regime set
up under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), which em-
phasizes control of donation by the patient himself or herself and a
determination regarding organ donation before that patient be-
comes ill. The revised (1987) UAGA explicitly states that a gift of
an organ "does not require the consent or concurrence of any other
person after the death of the donor ... ."'8 This authority of the
patient/donor to control the organ donation decision had been pro-
vided for in the original (1968) version, but subsequently was re-
stated specifically for emphasis and for certainty.19
Despite this legal regime under the UAGA, apparently the fact
is that family approval is always, or almost always, sought for organ
donation.2 ° This is the so-called family veto.21 Opponents of shift-
ing the locus away from the bedside worry that it de-emphasizes
next-of-kin consent. That, in turn, deprives the family of an oppor-
tunity for "[p]romoting a sense of community through acts of gen-
erosity."22 The DHHS Task Force Report clearly places in the
value balance lifesaving that can come from transplantation, on the
one hand, and "the value of social practices that enhance and
17. Disappointment with required request has led some to revisit the more drastic pro-
posal of presumed consent - i.e., presuming that consent for organ donation exists in the
absence of specific evidence on the question of intent. See, eg., Spital, supra note 1. The
proposal for presumed consent was made as early as 1968 by Professors Dukeminier and
Sanders. See Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & David Sanders, Organ Transplantation: A Proposal for
Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 NEw ENG. J. MED. 413 (1968). At least part of
the rationale for presumed consent, even in its earliest iteration, was a sense of discomfort
associated with asking for next-of-kin consent for organ donation. See id. at 416 (noting that
"[lo someone whose relative is about to die, asking for the kidneys may seem a ghoulish
request").
18. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr AcT (1987) § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 1992) (super-
seding 1968 version).
19. The commentary to the 1987 UAGA makes it clear that the explicit language
adopted in § 2(h) of the 1987 UAGA was designed to codify expressly the intention of § 2(f)
(now § 2(h)) of the 1968 UAGA. What led to the explicit language in § 2(h) of the 1987
UAGA was evidence that family approval was routinely required by organ procurement
agencies, despite the provisions of the UAGA. Section 2(f) was designed to "remove any
uncertainty." UAGA (1987), id. at 14 (cmt.).
20. John A. Robertson, Supply and Distribution of Hearts for Transplantation: Legal
Ethical, and Policy Issues, 75 CIRCULATION 77, 78 (1987).
21. The authors of the original (1968) UAGA intended to eliminate this family veto.
The Comments to the 1968 UAGA stated that the UAGA "recognizes and gives legal effect
to the right of the individual to dispose of his own body without subsequent veto by others."
Refusal by the transplant community to honor the decision of an individual to donate his or
her own organs for transplantation without express family approval is, therefore, essentially
lawless. UAGA, 8A U.L.A. 35, cmt. at 36 (1987).
22. OTTF Report, supra note 8, at 28.
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strengthen altruism and our sense of community, '2 3 on the other
hand. Note that this value has nothing to do, strictly speaking, with
transplants. Instead, it concerns itself with a vision of society, of
community and solidarity, and deems it necessary and appropriate
to balance lifesaving against this communal vision of the good
society.
3. Elimination of Donor/Family Control Over Organ
Distribution
Since the organ for transplant is deemed a "national resource"
under the DHHS Task Force Report24 and under controlling fed-
eral organ transplantation policies and principles, it is argued that
the elimination of control by the patient/donor, or the family of the
patient/donor, over the distribution of organs donated for trans-
plant is an ethical imperative. Under this ideal, the donor and the
family cannot assign an organ because it is simply not "theirs" to
assign.25 The UAGA, the state-adopted legal regime in this area,
gives the donor and the family the right to assign the organ to a
designated beneficiary. In fact, the UAGA creates a legally en-
forceable right in the beneficiary, if one is designated. So, the legal
structure set up in the late 1960's and early 1970's created quite a
different legal regime from the currently prevailing ethic in the
field.26
4. Centralized Criteria for Organ Distribution
The fourth organ transplantation policy value that I have identi-
fied - mandating that a centralized set of criteria govern the sys-
tem of organ distribution - follows naturally from the notion that
the organ, once donated, is a "national resource" that society is re-
sponsible for distributing. Once the family decides to donate the
deceased's organ for the benefit of society, it is the duty of society to
formulate criteria for the distribution of organs as a "national re-
source", thereby substituting collective decisionmaking for patient
or family determination. The approach of the DHHS Task Force
23. Id. (quoting THE HASTINGS CENTER, ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
TRANSPLANTATION," 2 (Oct. 1985)).
24. Id. at 86.
25. Under the recommendations of the 1986 Department of Health and Human Services
Task Force Report, OTTF Report, id., donated organs are to be considered "a national re-
source to be used for the public good." In such a regime, "[o]rgans would become socialized,
with individual donors stripped of power to control the destiny of their donated organs or to
designate specific beneficiaries." See Blumstein, supra note 9, at 486.
26. See Blumstein, supra note 9, at 486-90.
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and the prevailing view of the Organ Procurement and Transplanta-
tion Network are in direct tension with the patient/family control
provisions of the UAGA.
5. An Organized, Unified, Integrated System of Organ
Procurement and Distribution
As set forth in the DHHS Task Force Report, and as imple-
mented by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network,
the vision of appropriate public policy calls for centralized control
and nationally uniform guidelines governing organ procurement
and distribution, organ transplantation activities at the transplanta-
tion centers themselves, and histocompatibility laboratories. The
notion is that a social services delivery network, organized and con-
trolled by professionals, should dictate how organs are procured
and transplanted.
B. Organ Transplantation Values Within the Broader Health
Policy Context
The values undergirding organ transplant policy are in distinct
tension with the values that have emerged in the larger health pol-
icy context. They also seem strangely at odds with a policy of en-
couraging an increased supply of transplantable organs.
A fundamental element of health policy over the last ten years
has been competition and the role of markets. "Perhaps the most
striking characteristic of the health care industry as it has developed
in the last decade has been the recognition that competition and
markets have an important role to play in the health policy
arena."27  What are the market-oriented values that so strikingly
contrast with the values undergirding organ transplant policy?
1. The Use of Incentives
Not so long ago, the consideration of the use of incentives in the
health policy arena was deemed inappropriate, a taboo, a subject
not for polite company. The use of incentives in medical care was
rejected on the related grounds of ethics and effectiveness. Ethi-
cally, the objection stemmed from the ideological commitment in
27. See James F. Blumstein, Reevaluating the Federal Role in Organ Transplantation
Policy: The Relationship Between the Government and the Organ Procurement and Trans-
plantation Network, 35 (June 1989) (unpublished paper, on file at Vanderbilt University
School of Law). See also James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government's
Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 849 (1981).
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some quarters that unrestricted access to medical care on the basis
of medical need was the appropriate normative benchmark. This
was a component of the rhetorical espousal of medical care as a
right.28 If one believes that access to medical care should be
costless to users, the imposition of financial disincentives is directly
in conflict with that principle. Obviously, if one starts from the
premise that an individual's utilization of medical services should
bear no economic consequences for the beneficiary of the treatment,
the use of financial disincentives will have unacceptable distributive
effects. 2
9
In terms of effectiveness, financial incentives were questioned
because of the prevailing medical view that money did not affect
how patients were treated. It was assumed that there was a correct
course of treatment, and that was a professionally determined deci-
sion. Science not economic incentives drove medical care diagnosis
and treatment decisions. Therefore, financial incentives could not
be effective because they did not influence medical care decision-
making. And, implicitly, to the extent that scientific and profes-
sional judgments might indeed be influenced by financial
considerations, that was an inappropriate deviation from the clini-
cally correct scientific pathway.
The ethical issue is now seen as more richly textured than it
once was. The rhetoric of rights and equality has been deem-
phasized, replaced in responsible circles by concern about the role
of government in providing for an adequate level of services to indi-
viduals unable to afford medical care.3" Further, there is now a
broader understanding that establishing a relationship between
utilization of medical resources and expenditures by patients as con-
sumers is not always inappropriate. Medical care is not monolithic;
in some areas, it may be troublesome to use financial incentives, but
with respect to other types of care use of incentives to shape behav-
ior might be acceptable.
With respect to effectiveness, it is now commonplace for ana-
28. See generally James F. Blumstein, Thinking About Government's Role in Medical
Care, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 853 (1988); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, and Dem-
ocratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1067 (1981).
29. See, eg., T. R. Marmor et al., Medical Care and Procompetitive Reform, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 1003, 1014 (1981) (stating that "[clost sharing amounts to a tax or user fee imposed
on the sick and is a de facto transfer of wealth from the sick to the healthy").
30. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO
HEALTH CARE, A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE
AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 18 (1983).
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lysts to examine the effects of incentives on conduct in the health
arena. This is no longer an oddity. It is quite mainstream. And
there is a recognition that economically unrestrained decisionmak-
ing in medical care, as in other areas, has consequences in terms of
resource utilization. Thus, the ideological commitment to un-
restricted access has run into a hitherto unrecognized economic re-
ality. Not only are distributive values at issue when financial
incentives are under consideration. Elimination of financial consid-
erations from medical care resource allocation decisions has the
consequence of increasing the aggregate levels of resource utiliza-
tion. This links the ethical and the effectiveness grounds for ob-
jecting to the use of financial disincentives. The cost of maintaining
the ethical case against incentives is elevated once one accepts the
position that overall patterns of utilization are affected (upwardly
biased) by the absence of financial considerations in the medical
care decisionmaking process.31 Moreover, there is now greater rec-
ognition of the broad range of medical services; not all medical
treatment fits the model of life-or-death treatment. Much care is
palliative in character, and much expense in medical care involves
careful consideration of the value of buying incremental levels of
reduced uncertainty.3" The existence of clinical uncertainty, re-
flected in the widely divergent and unexplained procedure rates
across providers in seemingly similar circumstances,33 further sug-
gests an appropriate role for incentives. The evidence about diver-
gent procedure rates undermines the assumption of a monolithically
correct mode of treatment. In this world of uncertainty, it should
no longer be inappropriate to allow financial considerations to enter
into decisionmaking. The assumption can no longer be indulged
that consideration of financial incentives undermines scientifically
clear-cut clinical pathways. These factors - the many faces of
medical care services and the existence of clinical uncertainty -
lend further legitimacy to the use of incentives in many areas of
medical care.
Now recognized to have an effect in influencing behavior, finan-
cial disincentives are widely in use, despite the earlier ideological
objections. DRGs (diagnostic related groups), just to take one ex-
31. For a general discussion of these trade-off issues, see Clark C. Havighurst & James
F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70
Nw. U. L. REv. 6 (1975).
32. Id. at 12-13.
33. See John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Deliv-
ery, 182 SCIENCE 1102 (1973).
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ample, have shaped behavior. There has been an increasing empha-
sis on ambulatory care, and that is a direct result of the financial
incentives created by DRGs. Hospitals downsized staffs, shortened
lengths of stay, built outpatient clinics and outpatient surgery cen-
ters. At many medical centers, new construction emphasizes ex-
pansion of outpatient services. These are clearly supply-side
responses to incentives.34
2. Enhanced Respect for Pluralism and Decentralization
At one time in the broader health policy arena, commentators
asked or inquired about the preferred way to organize the health
care delivery system. In the early 1970's, Health Maintenance Or-
ganizations (HMOs) were promoted by some because they were
seen as the good monolithic model by which to deliver health care.
The mindset was that a consensus would form on the question of
what is the single best way of organizing the system of health care
delivery. The current trend, however, is toward pluralism and de-
centralization, that is toward diversity as in other segments of the
economy. Much of this thinking has been influenced by the findings
of Jack Wennberg35 and others36 concerning the existence of clinical
uncertainty and the existence of striking, unexplained diversity in
practice patterns. We now recognize that we do not have a mono-
lithic system, and perhaps such a monolithic system is not a desira-
ble objective.
In summary, then, the foregoing principles - competition and
incentives, and pluralism and decentralization - have seemed to
influence the rest of the health policy arena in the past decade.
These principles appear to be strikingly at odds with the strongly
held, fundamental principles that are so widespread in the organ
transplantation arena. The logical next question is whether there
might be some appropriate extrapolation from the broader health
care context to the world of organ transplantation policy.
C. Mainstreaming Organ Transplantation Policy
What would organ transplantation policy look like if it were
more compatible with these other, mainstream trends in health pol-
34. Incentives have also played an augmented role on the demand side. For example,
increased attention to competition and markets has resulted in a focus on individual con-
sumer choice and patient involvement in decision-making.
35. See, eg., Wennberg & Gittelsohn, supra note 33.
36. See, ag., Mark R. Chassin et al., Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical
Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285 (1986).
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icy? First, it would allow the introduction of incentives; that is, it
would permit commerce in organ transplantation. Eliminating the
exclusive reliance on altruism would recognize and acknowledge
the priority of overcoming organ supply shortages and yet retain
fidelity to principles of autonomy and individual choice of donors or
their families.
Second, it would shift the exclusive focus from the family of the
dying patient to the patient himself or herself. This, of course, is
returning to the UAGA regime. It would shift decision-making to a
circumstance and time when the donor is capable of making compe-
tent choices regarding organ donation. It would restore patient and
donor autonomy and basically restore the regime of the UAGA.
Such a policy would undertake to make the organ donation vision
of the UAGA work well rather than disregarding the philosophical
underpinnings of the UAGA.
Third, it would vest control over organ disposition with the do-
nor or the donor's family. This would give the donor or the donor's
family the psychological satisfaction of benefiting a human being.
This has the ancillary benefit of allowing designated beneficiaries,
persons or institutions, to have enforceable legal rights to the
donated organs. This is an important potential counterforce to the
present custom of requiring family consent, even though family
consent is not now legally necessary.
Combining donor or family control over organ disposition with
a forward contract of sale for the use of organs at death would alter
the entire nature and perception of the transaction. Transplant pro-
curement and surgical teams would have to defer to what is essen-
tially a commercial judgment effectuated while the donor was alive
and of sound mind. This would create a new calculus. At the pres-
ent time the players are the procurement people, the physician of
the potential donor, and the family. If the family objects, the pru-
dent lawyer would advise the client, "look, the family members are
the only ones around who can sue; they're the only ones who can
cause trouble; they're the only ones who can go to the newspaper -
so, defer to the family." With an enforceable contract, other play-
ers enter the game, and their interests must be taken into account.
There is the patient/donor speaking not by means of an abstract
donor card but specifically and compellingly through a commercial
transaction. There is also the other party to the contract - the
buyer/broker - who says "we did a deal and it's important to re-
spect the contract." And third, and perhaps most importantly,
there is an identified donee, a beneficiary who is lying in a hospital
[Vol. 3:1
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waiting to have his or her life saved. The beneficiary would say
"the family may be finicky about this and I respect the family's
judgment, but a deal was done, reliance on the transaction has been
established, and the financial benefit has accrued or will accrue to
the donor/seller or his or her beneficiary. My life and health are in
the balance, and by enforcing the provisions of the contract I am
respecting the autonomy of the donor, who made the choice to save
lives by allowing use of his or her organs for transplantation."
Moreover, while one can understand the concerns of the family,
those concerns must be put in context. The balance must appropri-
ately consider not only the squeamishness of the family of the po-
tential organ supplier but must also examine the priority of saving
an identified life and fulfilling a commitment made by the potential
"donor" when he or she was competent to choose. The representa-
tive of the donee or of the contracting party would be facing a very
different calculus on the evening news than currently exists. The
public relations climate would inevitably concentrate on the pri-
macy of lifesaving, especially when to save a life would be to fulfill
the terms of a freely and fairly negotiated agreement and to honor
the autonomy of the patient/donor/organ seller. So the introduc-
tion of commerce changes the legal advice, the public relations, the
politics, and the whole nature of the transaction. The existence of a
legally enforceable contract and the existence of enormous lifesav-
ing stakes once there is an identified beneficiary create a tremendous
counterforce to the current system.
Fourth, public policy would recognize a value to pluralism and
diversity. It would allow for experimentation and innovation.
There would be a substitution for the monolithic, national system of
control that we currently have in the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS). The Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network (OPTN), administered by UNOS, still could be retained
for education, for information, for the smooth transfer of organs,
for matching of organs and so forth, but the OPTN would not have
a regulatory, command-and-control function. It would recognize
local and regional differences. It would respond to the need for
clinical experimentation. In short, it would facilitate the smooth
functioning of organ transplantation procedures and help to im-
prove quality, but it would not seek to govern or control the pro-
cess. Instead, the OPTN would respect pluralism and diversity.
Fifth, under a more mainstream policy orientation, there would
be concern regarding the restrictive features of the current national
system. There is considerable risk associated with the professional
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dominance that has characterized the medical care industry histori-
cally,3 7 and that risk is particularly acute when the profession is in a
position to exert control over potential competitors who seek to
enter the market. The organ transplantation field has been charac-
terized by professional control, and the OPTN provides a vehicle by
which the professionals can impose their vision on potential com-
petitors. The authority exercised by UNOS as administrator of the
OPTN, if unconstrained, poses a considerable threat to the evolu-
tion of pluralism and competition in the organ transplantation
marketplace.
At present, it is unclear who actually controls the OPTN pol-
icy-making process. Elsewhere, I have criticized the regulatory au-
thority exercised by UNOS as administrator of the OPTN.38 Partly
in response to such criticism,39 DHHS has asserted its power to
review and approve of all OPTN regulatory policies." Whether
DHHS will rubber-stamp the regulatory vision of the OPTN em-
braced by UNOS, or whether it will strike out in a different direc-
tion is still unclear. It is within the power of DHHS, however, to
alter the vision of the network so as to allow competition and en-
courage the promotion and preservation of different views on an
array of organ transplantation issues. A particularly important ob-
jective, in this regard, would be to hold in check barriers to entry by
new programs and to encourage young Turks to enter the field of
organ transplantation.
II. DOES ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION WARRANT A
DIFFERENT POLICY APPROACH FROM THAT OF
MAINSTREAM MEDICAL CARE?
I have described mainstream public policy in the overall health
care arena, explained how organ transplantation policy does not co-
incide with the mainstream, and analyzed what organ transplanta-
tion policy might look if it did coincide. Apart from different
ideological perspectives, does the field of organ transplantation war-
rant such a different policy approach from that of mainstream med-
ical care? I now want to present an approach toward consideration
of that question.
37. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE (1982).
38. See Blumstein, supra note 9, at 478.
39. See id. at 496 n.245.
40. See Notice, Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration, 54 Fed. Reg. 51802 (1989).
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A. The Presumption for Incentives in a Market System
I would start with the assumption that organ transplantation
policies should allow for financial incentives in the absence of con-
vincing arguments to the contrary. Evidence from elsewhere in the
health arena shows that incentives affect behavior. Evidence from
abroad shows that financial incentives dramatically increase levels
of transplantable organ supply.4 1 The issue is increasingly being
raised and discussed favorably in professional meetings and fo-
rums.42 And a recent survey performed under the auspices of
UNOS and published in The Lancet demonstrates that a majority of
the respondents believed that some form of compensation should be
offered in the United States to donors of transplantable organs; only
two percent of those surveyed commented that use of financial in-
centives would be immoral or unethical.43 I would require that
those seeking to outlaw incentives in the area of organ transplanta-
tion persuasively make the case against commerce empirically or
ethically. "In a nation whose institutions have relied on market
mechanisms for making basic economic choices," governmental ac-
tion that prohibits the use of incentives, which constitute a funda-
mental component of the market system, "bears a burden of
persuasion.""
B. Organ Procurement Is a Form of "Commerce" and
Transplantable Organs Can Be a Form of "Property"
Under the United States Constitution
In interesting ways, some courts have reinforced the case for
allowing financial incentives to be introduced into the organ trans-
plantation arena. A federal district court has found that organ pro-
curement is "commerce" and is therefore protected by the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution.45 Also, a fed-
41. See Raj Chengappa, The Organs Bazaar, INDIA TODAY, July 31, 1990, at 30.
42. See, eg., Thomas G. Peters, Financial Incentives in Organ Donation: Current Issues,
21 DIALYSIS & TRANSPLANTATION 270 (1992); Peters, supra note 11; TRANSPLANTATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS IN THE '90s AND BEYOND 4 (unpublished consensus report of a
forum presented by The Annenberg Washington Program of Northwestern University, The
American Medical Association, and the Annenberg Center for Health Sciences at Eisen-
hower, April 22-25, 1990, (on file with the Annenberg Washington Program of Northwestern
University)). But see Leon R. Kass, Organs for Sale? Propriety, Property, and the Price of
Progress, 107 PuB. INrEREST 65 (1992).
43. See Dilip S. Kittur et al., Incentives for Organ Donation? 338 LANCET 1441 (1991).
44. James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Planning and Regulation Through
Certificate of Need: An Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 3.
45. Delaware Valley Transplant Program v. Coye, 678 F. Supp. 479 (D.N.J. 1988)
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eral appeals court has held that a transplantable organ can be con-
sidered a form of "property" protected against deprivation under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
In Delaware Valley Transplant Program v. Coye,47 the State of
New Jersey forbade New Jersey hospitals from using an out-of-state
organ procurement organization (OPO). A Philadelphia-based
OPO that operated in southern New Jersey challenged the regula-
tion as a violation of the commerce clause,48 which prohibits state
discrimination against interstate commerce.4 9 The court found for
the Philadelphia OPO and issued an injunction against New Jersey.
Under commerce clause principles, New Jersey could not bar the
interstate shipment of transplantable organs and could not ban the
Philadelphia OPO from operating in New Jersey.50
In order to reach its decision, the court had to find that organ
procurement and distribution constitute a form of commerce.5"
The court in Delaware Valley Transplant Program relied upon Phil-
adelphia v. New Jersey,52 a constitutional challenge under the com-
merce clause to New Jersey's banning of the dumping of garbage
from Philadelphia in New Jersey landfills. The Supreme Court in
Philadelphia v. New Jersey held that the traffic in garbage was a
form of commerce and struck down New Jersey's ban on the impor-
tation of garbage as impermissible discrimination.5 3 Just as the
state in Philadelphia v. New Jersey could not ban the importation of
an article of commerce (garbage), it could not ban the exportation
of an article of commerce (transplantable organs) in Delaware Val-
(granting injunction based upon the claim that state's designation of sole organ donor pro-
curement agency for the State of New Jersey is a violative of the commerce clause).
46. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the wife of a
deceased man had a property right in the decedent's corneas). The California Supreme
Court, on the other hand, has held that cells from a removed spleen, used to form a commer-
cially valuable cell line to produce lymphokines, are not a form of "property" protected
under the state tort doctrine of conversion. Moore v. Regents of the University of Cal., 793
P.2d 479 (1990).
47. Supra note 45.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
49. Although the commerce clause is drafted as an authorization of power to the federal
government, it has been interpreted for over a century to operate, in its dormant state, as an
independent limitation on state police powers that unduly burden or discriminate against
interstate commerce. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n., 432 U.S.
333 (1977).
50. Supra note 45.
51. Id.
52. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
53. Id.
[Vol. 3:1
1993] THE CASE OF COMMERCE IN TRANSPLANTABLE ORGANS 17
ley Transplant Program.54
In Brotherton v. Cleveland,5" a "pulseless" person was found in
an automobile, was taken to a hospital, and was pronounced dead
on arrival. Because the death was considered a possible suicide, the
body was taken to the county coroner's office for an autopsy. After
the autopsy, the coroner permitted the decedent's corneas to be re-
moved and used as "anatomical gifts." No approval for the ana-
tomical gift was sought or received from the decedent's wife. The
wife sued alleging that the county coroner had unconstitutionally
deprived her of "property" (her husband's corneas) without due
process of law.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted
that the wife's claim was "dependent upon her having a constitu-
tionally protected property interest in her husband's corneas." 6
Upon an analysis of Ohio's laws, the Court of Appeals held that the
wife had such a constitutionally protected property interest in her
husband's comeas. 57
The invocation of the commerce clause in Delaware Valley
Transplant Program and the concept of property in Brotherton sug-
gest that courts are not uncomfortable with the use of traditional
commercial paradigms in considering organ transplantation issues.
By analogy, these decisions lend support to the growing acceptance
of adopting some form of a commercial paradigm in the organ
transplantation context.
C. The Advantages of a Market Approach
What are the advantages of the market approach, an approach
that would allow individuals (or parents on behalf of their children)
to enter into forward contracts while alive and in good health for
the use of their organs for transplantation after their death?5" I
54. The Supreme Court has held that bans on importation and on exportation of articles
of commerce are presumptively unconstitutional. See, eg., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322 (1979).
55. Brotherton, supra note 46.
56. Id. at 479.
57. For a discussion of the Brotherton case in the context of considerating whether a
presumed consent statute would constitute an unconstitutional taking of property, see Mehl-
man, supra note 13, at 53-59. On the general issue of body parts as property, see Guido
Calabresi, Do We Own Our Bodies?, 1 HEALTH MATRIx 5 (1991).
58. In this article, I want to avoid specifying a specific market-based approach. My
objective is to argue the general case. In practice, I would allow the market to function in
developing effective strategies for inducing an increase in the supply of transplantable organs.
The UNOS-sponsored article published in THE LANCET identified the following as "[s]ome of
the more popular potential financial donor compensations" covered in the UNOS survey:
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want to set forth two rationales simply and succinctly and then ex-
amine, at greater length, criticisms leveled at the use of markets.
First, there is the libertarian argument in support of the use of
incentives and markets. This position emphasizes respect for the
autonomy of the donor (and the ability of the donor to choose), de-
emphasizes paternalism, and strengthens the hand of the individual
rather than the family.59 Payment to "donate"'  allows a person to
determine his or her own organs' fate, respects the right of the
buyer to contract, and recognizes the ability of the medically needy
donee beneficiary to benefit from the transaction.
In addition to the libertarian argument, there is also the utilita-
rian argument. That is, would or could incentives increase organ
supply? Permitting contracts for the sale of organs and making pro-
vision for a registry of potential donors would provide pressure to
pursue transplants aggressively. A source of potential suppliers
could be expected to come forward,61 and, once a contract had been
entered into, the purchaser and the ultimate beneficiary would be
"(1) assistance in the payment of funeral expenses; (2) a cash award to the estate of the donor;,
(3) a cash award to a charity of the donor/donor family's choosing; (4) a limited low-cost life
insurance policy redeemable upon the donation of organs by the deceased policy holder." See
Kittur et al., supra note 43. Professor Henry Hansmann has proposed a reduction in medical
insurance premiums for those who sign up to donate their organs at death. See Henry
Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, in ORGAN TRANS-
PLANTATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 57 (James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan
eds., 1989). Dr. Thomas Peters has proposed a death benefit of $1000, analogous to a social
insurance payment, for those whose organs are used in transplantation. See Peters, supra
note 11. There have been numerous proposals for specific market-based systems designed to
increase the supply of transplantable organs. I would like now to acknowledge those other
proposals, although this is not designed to be a comprehensive listing. See, eg., Roger D.
Blair & David L. Kaserman, The Economics and Ethics of Alternative Cadaveric Organ Pro-
curement Policies, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 403 (1991); Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of
Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989);
Richard Schwindt & Aidan R. Vining, Proposal for a Future Delivery Market for Transplant
Organs, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 483 (1986); Aidan R. Vining & Richard
Schwindt, Have a Heart: Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs for Infants and Chil-
dren, 7 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 706 (1988). See also Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got
Bette Davisrs] Eyes'" Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs under the
Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 528 (1990). For critiques of these
proposals, see, e.g., Kass, supra note 42; Richard D. Guttmann, The Meaning of "The Eco-
nomics and Ethics of Alternative Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies," 8 YALE J. ON REG.
453 (1991).
59. See, eg., Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CrR. REP., Oct. 1986,
at 28.
60. The term "donate" is a bit of an oxymoron in this context. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that we are so imbued with the language of altruism that the term donor comes natu-
rally, even when the proposal under consideration involves a mixture of altruism and the use
of financial incentives rather than pure altruism through donation.
61. See Chengappa, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 3:1
1993] THE CASE OF COMMERCE IN TRANSPLANTABLE ORGANS 19
forceful advocates for the effective use of transplantable organs to
save lives.
D. Criticisms of Markets
Criticisms leveled at the use of markets for increasing the supply
of transplantable organs can be either empirical or ethical in charac-
ter. In understanding and evaluating the criticisms of markets for
transplantable organs, the analyst must bear in mind the framework
within which to consider objections to market-based proposals. In
that context, it is worth reiterating that the burden of persuasion
should lie with those advocating making market transactions illegal.
Ultimately, the assignment of the burden of persuasion may well be
outcome determinative, at least with regard to some portions of the
argument.
1. Empirical Criticisms
It is noteworthy that many critics of the use of markets and
incentives have focused on an empirical claim. Their argument is
that the use of financial incentives - allowing the market to func-
tion in this area - will not result in an increase in the supply of
transplantable organs. The same claim was made ten to fifteen
years ago regarding financial incentives in medicine generally. But
the empirical evidence from the experience of the last ten years in
the medical arena refutes this. Incentives work. Objectors raise
various concerns about the state of mind of potential donors -
fears, uncertainty and ignorance. These deal not with the feasibil-
ity of a system of incentives but with the price that would be needed
to induce supply. Concerns concentrated on this type of donor
frame of mind do not address the question whether or not incentives
would work. If people are not inclined to donate, then that means
they will require more in the way of an inducement. Prospective
buyers would have to raise the price. This focuses, as an economist
would say, on the nature or characteristics of the supply curve, on
its price elasticity, not on whether inducements would ultimately
work. It is artificial to think in terms of absolutes - yes, people
will contract for anatomical "gifts," or no, they will not enter into
such contracts. It is better to think of what inducements are needed
to encourage sufficient supply so as to satisfy the demand. That is,
the issue is one of degree not one of absolutes.62
62. Quality, which is a concern, arguably could be monitored where there is a contract
and where patients have agreed to allow their organ to be used for transplant at their death.
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If the issue concerning commerce in transplantable organs is re-
ally an empirical argument - i.e., would it work to increase the
supply of transplantable organs -, then the scientist's view should
come into operation: if in doubt, do a controlled experiment. De-
fine a region, repeal the federal ban on the purchase and sale of
organs for transplant in that area,6 3 and, with proper controls and
monitoring, let us see what happens.64
The problem is that this scientific approach of experimentalism
is not satisfactory to many of the market critics. They worry that
the altruistic system will be undermined and that the damage will
be irreversible. The thought seems to be that the use of incentives is
like an incurable infectious disease - once it is unleashed, it will
deal a fateful and fatal blow to the altruistic underpinnings of the
existing system of organ donation, a blow from which the existing
system would not recover.
This is a hard position to counter because neither side has firm
data. The evidence from India and Egypt indicates that induce-
ments do work.65 Evidence from other areas of health care suggest
the same thing. It is not reasonable to maintain an empirically-
based criticism of financial incentives and simultaneously deny soci-
ety the opportunity at least to have an experiment, even if only in a
region and not in the whole nation.66
In appraising the empirical criticism, the analyst must return to
first principles so as assess the argument within the appropriate ana-
lytical framework: the burden of persuasion is on those seeking to
outlaw market-oriented behavior in our democratic society. In the
absence of firm evidence, or an experiment, we should legalize com-
The purchaser would have an incentive to keep the seller's organ healthy, and in most scena-
rios the seller would have the same incentive. This makes the organ market distinguishable
from the blood sale market, where quality is a serious concern.
63. Section 301(a) of the National Organ Transplant Act, enacted in 1984, bans the use
of any "valuable consideration" for inducing potential donors to allow their organs to be used
for transplantation. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1988).
64. The proposal for a controlled experiment accords, in broad brush, with the death-
benefit idea recently advanced by Dr. Thomas Peters, although the contours of his proposal
seem more narrowly drawn than the controlled experiment proposed in text. See Peters,
supra note 11.
65. See Chengappa, supra note 41.
66. The empirical argument becomes linked to the ethical argument to some extent.
Part of the concern about irreversibility is a concern that altruism will be eroded in practice.
Critics of markets decry this, finding it lamentable as a policy development. Perhaps altruism
has some immeasurable independent virtue worthy of some positive evaluation in the poli-
cymacking process, but that virtue is hardly confined to the organ transplantation arena.
When measured against the benefits of saving lives and improving health, the independent
value of altruism surely must play second fiddle.
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merce in organs for transplant, as other commerce in medical care
is now permitted.
2. Ethical Criticisms
I now consider the ethical criticisms of commerce in transplant-
able organs. I deal with these in specific contexts, taking on the
harder claims first.
The Effect of Markets on the Distribution of Organs. Much of
the ethical concern regarding commerce in transplantable organs
focuses on the issue of distribution. That is, who gets the organ
available for transplantation? What is the effect of a market in
transplantable organs on the distribution of organs? This set of
questions focuses on the demand side of the market.
The ethical thesis is that organs are different from other com-
modities or services that are distributed by the market system. Or-
gans, argue critics of markets, should be allocated by medical
criteria, not by financial considerations. This claim needs to be
taken seriously. I would note, however, that some make the same
claim for all medical care.67 We know that financial considerations
are taken into account in medical care generally, so the issue re-
garding transplantable organs would have to be argued on the basis
that organ transplantation is different from other forms of medical
care - not only from medical care generally but also from compa-
rable lifesaving therapies.68
In my view, the original banning of market transactions in
transplantable organs stemmed from an understandable yet ulti-
mately unsophisticated linkage of issues surrounding the demand
and the supply sides of the market. A market in transplantable or-
gans can function on the supply side and, if desired on ethical
grounds. Society can leave the demand side to a non-market form
of distribution.
The concern by ethical critics of commerce in transplantable or-
gans is with the effect of wealth inequality on the distribution of
available organs. There is a special claim that while wealth inequal-
67. Ten years ago I was involved in a debate on rationing medical care in which the
claim was made that medical care should be allocated purely on the basis of medical criteria.
For opposing viewpoints on the debate, see James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Re-
sources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TExAs L. Rv. 1345 (1981); James
F. Blumstein, Distinguishing Government's Responsibility in Rationing Public and Private
Medical Resources, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 899 (1982); and Rand E. Rosenblatt, Rationing "Nor-
mal" Health Car& The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TExAs L. REv. 1401 (1981).
68. On the question of government's role in paying for organ transplantation, see Blum-
stein, supra note 9, at 453-60.
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ity is acceptable as a general matter, it is unacceptable as a basis for
deciding which persons are to be recipients of organ transplants.69
This is the notion that organ transplants constitute a "merit
good." 0
The problem, however, can be resolved by public subsidy for
those whose inadequate level of wealth bars access. The kidney pro-
gram is an example of a publicly financed program for a specific
illness and a specific set of procedures. To establish a principled
basis for this type of categorical public support for kidney trans-
plantation, however, advocates must be prepared to justify a kidney
transplant program in comparison to other transplant therapies,
such as heart or liver transplants, which are more likely to deal with
life-threatening situations and which are not funded as generously
by the federal government.71 Also, those who make claims of spe-
cial consideration for transplant programs must be prepared to
demonstrate that the justification for special status for organ trans-
plantation does not apply as persuasively to non-transplant treat-
ments of other life-threatening illnesses (e.g., public financing of
drugs such as AZT for AIDS patients). Does society have an obli-
gation to provide a public subsidy to make available and distribute
this type of life-enhancing or life-prolonging drug? And if so, must
the drug be made available without a fee, so that commerce is com-
pletely eliminated in the allocation of the scarce resource? If wealth
can make a difference with regard to AZT, for example, why is it
unacceptable for financial considerations to enter into organ alloca-
tion decisions?
Special consideration for organ transplants must also distinguish
not only other lifesaving but also other quality-of-life-enhancing
procedures. Dialysis, after all, is an alternative to kidney transplan-
tation, albeit less desirable therapeutically.72 Thus, since an alterna-
tive treatment regimen exists, kidney transplantation is not
necessarily a lifesaving procedure. Other parts of the kidney trans-
69. Presumably, the life-or-death character of many transplants, coupled with the sup-
ply constraints on transplantable organs, distinguish organ transplantation from other areas
of medical care. Of course, this is an incomplete basis for distinction since there are other
lifesaving therapies and since not all transplants (eg., kidneys) are of a lifesaving character
given the availability of alternative therapies (eg., dialysis).
70. See James F. Blumstein & Michael Zubkoff, Perspectives on Government Policy in the
Health Sector, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.: HEALTH & Soc'Y 395, 407-12 (1973).
71. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Government Funding for Organ Transplants, in OR-
GAN TRANSPLANTATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 169 (James F. Blumstein & Frank
A. Sloan eds., 1989).
72. See Eggers, supra note 6.
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plantation process require a fee. Whereas kidneys cannot be paid
for by the patient, and kidney donors cannot receive compensation
for their beneficence, organ procurement organizations can be paid
for their organ procurement efforts by hospitals. Drugs are paid for,
hospital stays are paid for, physicians are compensated. Money
matters in every dimension of organ transplantation. It is not so
clear why ethical critics become so fastidious, so squeamish, about
paying for the lifegiving organ itself.
There is an irony at work here. Advocates for funding of organ
transplants by third-party payers claim that organ transplantation
is in fact ordinary and necessary medical care - mainstream, non-
experimental medicine indistinguishable from other lifesaving and
life-enhancing treatments for purposes of third-party reimburse-
ment. The claim that organ transplantation be covered by insurance
requires that organ transplantation be viewed as just another effec-
tive therapy, like many others covered and paid for under tradi-
tional medical insurance policies and programs. The claim for
third-party coverage rests on the mainstream status, the lack of
specialness of organ transplants. Yet that very specialness serves as
the ethical foundation of the underlying hostility to commerce in
transplantable organs. There is a clear tension between these two
positions.
Further, for these ethical objections to commerce in organs to
make sense, there must be a willingness on the part of the objectors
to exalt these distributive values above overall lifesaving and qual-
ity-of-life-enhancing objectives. This is true because, for the ethical
discussion, we must assume that, as an empirical matter, commerce
in transplantable organs will result in an increased supply of such
organs and, consequently, more saved and quality-of-life-enhanced
lives from transplantation procedures.
Some have made the forthright argument that it is better not to
save lives in order to maintain distributional equity. I find that ar-
gument troubling. If one assumes that a price induces more supply,
and that a wealthy person's life is thereby saved, how is the poor
person harmed as compared with the status quo? One must take
the position that it is better to deprive the wealthy person of a trans-
plant, which by hypothesis would not otherwise be available, in or-
der to preserve some sense of egalitarian justice. This is a difficult
outcome to impose on a person in the name of fairness since the
economically disadvantaged person is not benefited in any tangible
way by prohibiting the wealthier person from using his or her re-
sources to pay for a transplantable organ.
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This is a genuinely troubling ethical dilemma that, as an intel-
lectual matter, is worthy of further investigation, debate and discus-
sion. As a pragmatic matter, however, the issue can be finessed in
the name of incremental reform. For the time being, at least, mar-
ket-oriented reformist efforts can be concentrated on the introduc-
tion of commercial incentives on the supply side of the marketplace,
leaving intact a non-market-driven system for the distribution of
transplantable organs on the demand side.
The Effect of Markets on Live Donors. A second difficult ques-
tion is whether a prospective system of commerce in transplantable
organs should permit payment for use of organs provided by (i.e.,
sold by) live donors. At least for the present, this ethically serious
and troubling issue also can be finessed. Market-oriented reforms
can focus, at least at the initial stage, on the use of markets exclu-
sively for the sale of cadaveric organs, preferably by a forward
contract.
The ethical concern with live donors is coercion, but the coer-
cion claim may not be as much of a problem as some would argue.
While there is an increase in choice, it is coercion only if we equate
coercion with hard choices.
We do allow people to choose risk for a price. Life with one
kidney is risky. But the question is whether this is a socially accept-
able level of risk that should be subject to private choice and deci-
sionmaking or whether the risk should be banned by collective
action through paternalistic governmental regulation. Professor
Henry Hansmann, for example, has argued that the risk of living
with one kidney is quite moderate, equivalent to driving back and
forth to work sixteen miles a day.73 Society tolerates that level of
risk in other areas, he argues, why not in the transplant area as
well? Clearly there is a benefit for the recipient/purchaser, whose
health is improved. Arguably, there are also considerable benefits
for the "donor"/seller, who can use the funds received in the trans-
action for other advantageous purposes.
One must hasten to add that, if any system of commerce is es-
tablished involving live-"donor" organs, safeguards are necessary to
assure voluntarism and to bar other uses of body parts via coerced,
not induced sale. Still, despite any safeguards that one might de-
velop, the paternalism concern regarding live-"donor" organ sales is
real and pervasive.
Also, there is worry about what some view as organ imperialism
73. Hansmann, supra note 58, at 72-74.
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- the sale of organs by poor or third-world persons to provide or-
gans for wealthy people. Rationally, the analyst may note that the
sellers deem themselves better off, do not consider the risk to be
excessive, and deem organ donation to be an avenue of opportunity.
The skeptic may even call paternalistic objections to this activity
elitist or illustrative of a certain "feel-good" morality. Yet a typical
reaction is one, perhaps, of revulsion. And although this may be
irrational, non-rational, or exercising a form of symbolic hypocrisy,
the objections exist and persist.
The Effect of a Market for Cadaveric Organ Sale on the "Do-
nor's" Family and on Society. It is now appropriate to address the
issue of cadaveric organ sale. There are essentially two concerns
here - the potential effect of a market in cadaveric organs on the
family of the "donor" and the potentially dehumanizing effect of
organ sales on society.74
The family issue is a legitimate concern. By selling his or her
organs during life by forward contracting for transplantation at the
time of death, an individual takes charge of the disposition of his or
her organs at death. In the world of estate planning, this is not
unusual, rather it is the norm. By allowing sales and by enforcing
these forward contracts for organ transplantation, society validates
the autonomy of the individual. At the same time, society takes
away the ability of the family to veto the decedent's decision to al-
low use of his or her organs for transplantation purposes. This un-
doubtedly detracts from the "silver lining" phenomenon through
which family members, in the exercise of altruism, feel good about
giving the organs of a loved one to save the life of another human
being.
The psychological satisfaction of the family in this circumstance
can be considerable, but the autonomy of the patient, if it is to be
adequately respected, must outweigh the family's concern. This is,
of course, the normal pattern with respect to inheritance, and it is
the clear determination of the existing legal regime under the
UAGA, which already vests legal authority in the individual to do-
nate his or her organs for transplantation irrespective of the wishes
of the family. The family veto recognized in the transplant commu-
nity is an extralegal custom not validated by existing law. Indeed,
the UAGA was expressly drafted to overcome the family veto, giv-
ing primacy to the autonomy of the individual donor.75 Given the
74. For a forceful statement of this perspective, see Guttmann, supra note 58.
75. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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existing legal framework, which does not recognize the family veto,
the supposed loss of the family's psychological well-being is a weak
claim. Ultimately, the autonomy of the donor and the welfare of
the beneficiaries who receive the transplantable organs must out-
weigh the claims of the family.76 In any event, the establishment of
a market for cadaveric organs will take nothing from families to
which they are currently legally entitled."
The potentially adverse effect on society of a market in cadav-
eric organs stems from a concern about the commodification of
human body parts (HBPs).78 This is an abstract, hazy issue. For
example, Dr. Leon R. Kass, who objects to the use of markets in
transplantable organs, recognizes that his objections "appeal ...
largely to certain hard-to-articulate intuitions and sensibilities that
. . . belong intimately to the human experience of our own
humanity."79
One set of objections to commodification of HBPs focuses on
the value of communitarianism. There is the belief that the estab-
lishment of a market in cadaveric organs poses a threat to the value
of altruism. I just do not see this as a transplant issue. It is an issue
that deals with other, broader philosophical issues about how soci-
ety should be organized and about how people should be motivated
to live their lives. Advocates of communitarianism generally are
suspicious of what they regard as the atomization of society that
stems from reliance on markets for making economic allocation de-
cisions. They are hostile to market transactions, and they worry
that commodification of HBPs places yet another set of decisions
into an economic context with which they are none-too-pleased to
76. Rejection of the family veto was one of the recommendations stemming from a joint
forum of the American Medical Association, the Annenberg Washington Program of North-
western University, and the Annenberg Center for Health Sciences at Eisenhower: "An indi-
vidual's decision to donate should in every case be respected; health care professionals and
relatives should act in accordance with that decision, thus, respecting the donor's right and
fulfilling the donor's desires." TRANSPLANTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS IN THE '90S AND
BEYOND, supra note 42, at 2.
77. For individuals who wish to provide this form of psychic satisfaction to members of
their family, the option of delegating this choice to family members would continue to exist
under the UAGA. The choice for altruism as the basis for an anatomical gift at death would
still be available.
78. For a general discussion of the commodification issue, see Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
79. Kass, supra note 42, at 84. Dr. Kass asserts that the sale of body parts comes "peril-
ously close to selling out our souls," id. at 83, yet he concedes that "rational calculation"
justifies further extension of the lifesaving potential of organ transplantation, presumably by
sale of transplantable organs if need be. Id. at 86. Dr. Kass laments this conflict, which he
sees as posing a painful dilemma. Id.
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begin with. Again, I view this type of concern to be quite unrelated
to organ transplantation issues per se but rather related to broader
humanitarian concerns that underlie much of how market-based
economies function in general.
Significantly, in the context of a market for cadaveric organs,
there is no issue of coercion as there could be in the context of live-
"donor" organ sales. Similarly, there is no real issue of organ impe-
rialism, there is no concern regarding irreversibility,80 and there is
no problem of exploitation of the poor. Professor Lloyd Cohen,
who has written in support of a futures market in transplantable
organs, has a wonderful statement regarding the non-risk of ex-
ploitation of the poor in the context of a market for cadaveric or-
gans: "[I]n the cadaver market the vendors are neither rich nor
poor, merely dead.""s
The loss of altruism should not in itself be viewed as a problem,
except if it results in reduced supply of transplantable organs. Sup-
ply is an empirical not an ethical concern. The issue is not whether
or not altruism is a good thing. The question is whether market
transactions should be made illegal. Advocates of markets in ca-
daveric organs have no desire to make altruism a felony. Altruism
can co-exist peacefully with a flourishing market for cadaver or-
gans. The claim of market proponents is based upon principles of
freedom, autonomy, and choice. Indeed, when one carefully exam-
ines the argument for preserving altruism by outlawing market
transactions, one wonders whether the real fear is that legalization
of market transactions will in fact work. That is, given a choice,
people would choose to participate in a market and would abandon
altruism. Unpacked, the argument to outlaw market exchanges to
preserve altruism is in reality an argument to coerce altruism. This
surely is a strange way of promoting the supposed good feeling of
communitarian solidarity that comes from voluntary donations of
the organs of a recently deceased loved one for the benefit of an-
other human being.
To make out the case against market transactions in transplant-
able organs, advocates for that position must establish the unique
features of organs and organ transplantation. Since, in a market
economy, market-based transactions are the norm, those seeking to
curtail the operation of a market must show that there are special
80. When a transaction cannot be undone - e.g., the sale of an organ by a live "donor"
or the sale of a human being into slavery, - there may be a stronger reason to examine the
fairness and the wisdom of allowing exchange transactions.
81. See Cohen, supra note 58, at 30.
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reasons justifying the restriction. I will now argue that organs and
their transplantation are not unique in this policy-relevant sense.
There are numerous other lifesaving or life-enhancing therapies
for which sales are not prohibited. There is no ban on the sale of
alternatives to organ transplantation, such as kidney dialysis. There
is no ban on the sale of substitutes for failed body parts, such as
artificial organs and other artificial body parts. Thus, we are left
with a gnawing concern because the transplantable organ derives
from a dead human body. This is not an objection to the use of the
organs of a cadaver for transplantation purposes, since a donated
organ is acceptable. It is just a question of how we induce donors or
families to donate those organs. Does this, as Dr. Kass ominously
warns, really "come perilously close to selling out our souls"? 2
The UNOS-sponsored survey, which showed support for compensa-
tion for use of transplantable organs, would certainly call that pre-
dictive judgment into question. 3
Analysts must balance the hazy, abstract concern about the ef-
fect on society of the mechanism used to motivate individuals to
supply their organs at the time of death for transplantation against
other, fundamental values. When life and death are in the balance
as far as recipients are concerned and when libertarian values of
individual autonomy are involved as far as the "donor" is con-
cerned, I must conclude that there is an insufficient basis to warrant
a flat-out prohibition on forward contracting while an individual is
alive for the use of that individual's organs for transplantation at
the time of death.
CONCLUSION
I have discussed the advantages of allowing commerce in organs
in the form of forward contracts for transplantable cadaveric or-
gans.84 To summarize briefly, some of those advantages are:
e There is a shift in the locus of decisionmaking - away from
the bedside of the dying family member to an earlier time when an
individual can make a determination about organ sale or donation
while he or she is healthy and can act coolly and rationally;
* Recognition of market transactions promotes and validates
the autonomy of the individual donor/seller;
82. See Kass, supra note 42, at 83.
83. See Kittur et al., supra note 43.
84. As I have indicated earlier, I am not the first to advocate development of a market in
cadaveric organs. See sources cited supra note 58.
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* Legalization of market exchanges for cadaveric organs creates
a legal and public-relations counterforce at the time of a "donor's"
death so that the owner/purchaser of the organ and the potential
and identified recipient of the transplantable organ can counteract
the extralegal influence of the reluctant family of the potential do-
nor and possibly of the attending physician as well. 5
e Use of financial incentives is likely to induce a greater supply
of needed transplantable organs than the current, exclusively altru-
istic system.
These advantages take on added significance because of the
acute need for transplantable organs and the dearth of available or-
gan supply under the current system.86 This is where the success of
organ transplantation makes a difference. The squeamishness about
markets could be indulged when the stakes were not so high. The
lifesaving ability of organ transplantation means that organ supply
shortages are costing lives. The claim by organ transplantation ex-
perts to mainstream status within the medical community, along
with third-party payment for what is now considered to be ordinary
and necessary medical treatment, suggest that it is now time to em-
phasize the similarities between organ transplantation and other
forms of lifesaving and qualtity-of-life-enhancing medical proce-
dures rather than emphasizing the differences. Values regarding or-
gan transplantation fit within the mainstream. They are not unique.
We have allowed this ghettoization of organ transplantation policy
within the health policy arena to go on for too long. At this point I
do not argue for a complete, full-scale market approach. I do not
now call for creation of a market for live-"donor" organs. Nor do I
now call for experimenting with a market on the demand side for
the distribution of transplantable organs. But I do call for a con-
trolled supply-side experiment with the sale of cadaveric organs.
Permitting the sale of cadaveric organs in advance through forward
contracts, with the concomitant establishment of a computerized
donor registry, would represent a reasonable, modest, incremental
experiment, one that is well worth trying. This is especially true
given the lives at stake.7 This would allow for a constructive blend
of altruism and self-interest and nurture the hope that that combi-
85. An important safeguard would be a requirement that the physician who certifies the
death of the organ supplier be independent of the family of the decedent, of the family of the
potential recipient, of the owner of the organ, and of any institution that had a stake in the
transplant procedure.
86. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
87. See Peters, supra note 11.
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nation would help to reduce the existing shortage of transplantable
organs. Upon analysis, my reluctant conclusion is that the opposi-
tion to a proposal for experimenting with the sale of organs is based
upon prejudice not reason.
